We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped out. Finally, some stability results are provided for special classes of games.
Introduction
The most well-known and extensively used solution concept in noncooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium. The question how players may reach such equilibria is studied in a branch of game theory employing dynamic models of learning and strategic adjustment. The main dynamic processes in the theory of strategic form games include the replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) , the best-response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991) , and the Brown-Nash-von Neumann (BNN) dynamic (Brown and von Neumann, 1950) . Sandholm (2005) introduced a definition for well-behaved evolutionary dynamics through a number of desiderata (see Theorem 3.2 for precise definitions):
Existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solutions to the specified dynamic process, Nash stationarity: the stationary points of the process coincide with the game's Nash equilibria, Positive correlation: roughly speaking, the probability of "good" strategies increases, that of "bad" strategies decreases.
He showed that -unlike the replicator and the best-response dynamics -the family of BNN or excess-payoff dynamics is well-behaved.
In the present paper we analyze the target projection dynamic that was mentioned only briefly in the same paper by Sandholm (2005, pp. 166-167) . Our main results include the following:
Although the dynamic has a certain geometric appeal, Sandholm (2005, p. 167) wrote: "Unfortunately, we do not know of an appealing way of deriving this dynamic from a model of individual choice". This is remedied in Theorem 3.1, which provides a microeconomic foundation for the target projection dynamic. Following the control cost approach (Van Damme, 1991; Mattsson and Weibull, 2002; Voorneveld, 2006) , we show that it models rational behavior in a setting where the players have to exert some effort/incur costs to deviate from incumbent strategies. In other words: the target projection dynamic is a best-response dynamic under a certain status-quo bias. contexts), where there is a population of players for each role and the state variable reflects the empirical distributions of strategies; see Fudenberg and Levine (1998) , Sandholm (forthcoming) , and Weibull (1995) . In somewhat more detail, there are n populations, each with a continuum of agents: one for each player role. Agents from the different populations are randomly matched to play the normal form game; agents from population i choose actions from A i . The distribution α i ∈ i of actions is the population state. After having observed all population states and the earned payoff, individuals get the opportunity to revise their strategies, typically in such a way that populations evolve towards states where more profitable strategies are more popular. The expected motion of the populations defines the corresponding evolutionary dynamic.
Projections
This subsection contains some results on projections. In particular, Proposition 2.1 establishes a link between maximizing a linear function and certain projection problems. Proposition 2.2 gives a simple expression for projection onto the unit simplex. The proofs are in Appendix A.
As we have already mentioned, let x, y = m i=1 x i y i denote the usual inner product of two vectors x, y ∈ R m . Let · denote the standard Euclidean norm, i.e., x = x, x 1/2 . For z ∈ R, let [z] + := max{z, 0}.
Proposition 2.1. Let C ⊆ R n be nonempty and convex, a ∈ R n , c ∈ C and k > 0.
(i) The following two claims are equivalent:
(ii) The problem in (b) reduces to projecting c + k 2 a onto C:
The following proposition characterizes projection onto a unit simplex.
Proposition 2.2. Let P : R n → n denote the projection on the (n − 1)-dimensional unit simplex n : for x ∈ R n , P(x) := arg min y∈ n y − x .
(i) P is Lipschitz continuous.
(ii) For every x ∈ R n the projection on n can be rewritten as follows
where λ(x) ∈ R is the unique solution to
Remark 2.1. Proposition 2.2(ii) immediately implies that for all x ∈ R n and i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}:
The target projection dynamic
The target projection dynamic, the dynamic process governing the learning mechanism that we study in this paper, was mentioned briefly in the concluding section of Sandholm (2005, pp. 166-167) . It was originally defined in the framework of congestion networks by Friesz et al. (1994) . Definition 3.1. Consider a normal form game (N, (A i ) i∈N , (U i ) i∈N ). The target projection dynamic (TPD) is defined, for each i ∈ N, by the differential equatioṅ
where P i denotes the projection on i with respect to the usual Euclidean distance.
The basic idea is simple and standard for most dynamic processes in game theory: the payoffs associated with the different actions determine the direction in which their weights are changed by reinforcing the better actions and decreasing the weight of worse ones.
In particular, under the TPD, player i ∈ N starts from current mixed strategy α i and moves in the direction of the payoff vector U i (α) to obtain a preliminary target point for the revised strategy. Of course, simply running in the direction of the payoff vector U i (α) might take you outside the strategy simplex, but Proposition 2.2(ii) assures that projection onto the strategy simplex -i.e., choosing the nearest feasible strategy in terms of Euclidean distance -does not affect the order of the coordinates. See Fig. 1 for illustrations of the dynamic for a player with just two actions. The left panel involves a "standard" orthogonal projection; in the right panel, the feasible strategy nearest the preliminary target point α i + U i (α) involves setting the probability of playing the second action to zero.
The simplest dynamic embodying the basic idea of reinforcing actions with high payoffs at the expense of those with low ones is the best-response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991) : players place higher weight to their best responses according toα
where (4) is a differential inclusion, rather than a differential equation, since BR i (α) need not be a singleton. In any case, as it becomes obvious from Eq. (4), players do not switch to -but towardstheir best responses. That is, the best-response dynamic involves inertia which precludes them from switching directly to their best response.
The next theorem indicates that the TPD is essentially a best-response dynamic, albeit under a bounded rationality assumption, involving the introduction of a certain status-quo bias. We follow the control cost approach, which since its introduction by Van Damme (1991) in the study of equilibrium refinements has proved to be a versatile way of providing microeconomic foundations for a variety of models of strategic behavior (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Mattsson and Weibull, 2002; Voorneveld, 2006) . It does so by showing that such behavior is rational for decision makers who have to make some effort (incur costs) to implement their strategic choices. One intuitive way of modeling status-quo bias by player i could be as follows. Suppose that deviation from the current α i is costly/requires effort in the sense that by switching to a strategy β i , player i incurs a cost of 1 2 β i − α i 2 : staying at the current mixed strategy is costless, whereas large deviations, i.e., strategies further away from the current one in terms of Euclidean distance, incur larger costs. Taking such costs into account changes the optimization problem to
Let B i (α) ∈ i denote player i's (unique due to strict concavity of the goal function) best response against α, i.e., the unique solution to problem (5). Subject to these assumptions, we can now formulate the TPD as a best response dynamic: 
Proof. By definition,
so we need to establish that arg min
Theorem 3.1 shows that the TPD essentially is a best-response dynamic in a model of learning subject to two types of inertia. Firstly, it preserves the inertia that all best-response dynamics exhibit, i.e., the players do not switch to any of their best responses, but they place higher weight to them, thus shifting their behavior towards them. Secondly, players dislike moving away from their current strategies, the state variables in dynamic approaches to learning. The fact that they are averse to changing their current behavior makes the TPD a conservative rule of adjustment, and learning becomes slow.
It is much less natural to interpret the dynamic in terms of evolution in population games: there does not seem to be a convincing explanation -perhaps conformity issues might play a role -for why an agent would care about the connection between his own strategy and the distribution of strategies over his population.
As pointed out to us by Bill Sandholm, the TPD belongs to a larger family of dynamics, characterized by the degree of aversion towards shifting away from the current strategy. Consider the parametric dynamiċ
where k > 0. Comparing (3) and (8) shows that the latter is the TPD after rescaling the game's payoffs with a factor k/2. Such rescaling affects neither the best response correspondence, nor the direction of the payoff vector (important for positive correlation). Hence, the parametric family of TPD in (8), no matter how conservative rules of adjustment it imposes, has a series of nice properties as shown in the following sections. By Proposition 2.1(ii), increasing k leads to lower control costs: the weight placed on these costs by the perturbed payoff function is 1 k . The TPD arises when k = 2. When k → ∞, the control cost becomes arbitrarily small and players will -roughly speaking -put more effort into choosing a best response in the original game, with less concern about the costs from deviating from their current strategy. On the other hand, the lower k the more conservative the players become, since they start placing more weight on their aversion towards change.
In the limit (k → 0), players never change their current strategy.
The fact that the TPD is interpreted as a best-response dynamic with control costs does not imply that the dynamic is susceptible to the extensive literature on (perturbed) best response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) : Our status-quo bias models control costs arising due to deviations from the current state, while the usual approaches use control cost functions which:
• are independent of the current state: they define costs in terms of deviations from a fixed strategy, often uniform randomization (close your eyes and pick an action) as in Mattsson and Weibull (2002) and Voorneveld (2006), • are often required to be steep near the boundary of the strategy space, as in Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) .
The logit dynamic (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) , for instance, takes the form
for some noise parameter η > 0 and is obtained as a perturbed best-response dynamic where each player i uses as control cost the Kullback-Leibler divergence (or relative entropy) from a given mixed strategy β i to the mixed strategy (1/ J i , . . . , 1/ J i ) assigning equal probability to all actions. Formally, this relative entropy is defined as
where c = ln J i is a constant and we use the convention that 0 ln 0 = 0. This transforms, in contrast with (5), player i's optimization problem to
where η > 0 is the weight assigned to the control cost term.
General properties
Theorem 3.2 states that the target projection dynamic satisfies a number of desirable properties of "nice" evolutionary dynamics. Indeed, Sandholm (2005) 
Innovation: If some player is not at a stationary state and has an unused best response, then a positive probability is assigned to this best response. Formally, for each α ∈ and i ∈ N, ifα i = 0, but there is an action a j i
Proof. Nash stationarity: Let α ∈ . By Proposition 2.1, Theorem 3.1, and (3), the following chain of equivalences holds:
α is a Nash equilibrium ⇔ ∀i ∈ N: α i ∈ arg max
Basic solvability: The target projection dynamic (3) is Lipschitz continuous. Let i ∈ N. By assumption, the payoff U i is Lipschitz continuous, say with expansion factor C > 0. By Proposition 2.2, the projection is Lipschitz continuous with expansion factor 1. Using the triangle inequality, it follows for each α, β ∈ that
establishing Lipschitz continuity of the vector field in (3). Since P i maps onto i , it follows that
0. This makes forward-invariant. Together, these properties imply (Hirsch and Smale, 1974, Ch. 8 ) that for every initial state, a solution exists, is unique, Lipschitz continuous in the initial state, and remains in at all times.
Positive correlation: Let α ∈ and i ∈ N.
Theorem 3.1, one obtains:
Innovation: Assume that the premises of the innovation property hold, but thatα j i 0. We derive a contradiction. By Proposition 2.2 there is a λ ∈ R such that Berger and Hofbauer (2006) show that under the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic, introduced in Brown and von Neumann (1950) , there are games where a strictly dominated strategy survives. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007) generalize this example: for each evolutionary dynamic satisfying the properties in Theorem 3.2 -actually, they restrict attention to single-population games -it is possible to construct a game with a strictly dominated strategy that survives along solutions of most initial states.
Strict domination: mind the gap
As their result applies to our TPD, it is of interest to investigate whether there are additional conditions under which such "bad" actions are wiped out. The next result shows that this is the case if one action strictly dominates another and the "gap" between them is sufficiently large. (N, (A i ) i∈N , (U i ) i∈N ) 
since the difference between probabilities is bounded in absolute value by one. However, since [α (9) is smaller than 1, a contradiction. 2
Recall from the discussion on the parametric family of target projection dynamics (8) that they coincide with the TPD after rescaling payoffs. In particular, if one action strictly dominates another, the "gap" between them can be made arbitrarily large. This proves: Also if a player has only two actions and one of them is strictly dominated, then it is eventually eliminated: Proof. Let α ∈ . By Proposition 2.2, there is a λ(α) ∈ R such that the target projection dynamic for each of the two actions j = 1, 2 of population i can be rewritten aṡ
Since we project the two-dimensional vector onto the simplex, this implies
Combining these two expressions gives
a contradiction, since the left-hand side is at most one. By continuity of the payoffs on the compact set and strict domination, there is an ε > 0 such that
, so the probability α 
(U
ε, i.e., the probability α 2 i decreases at a rate bounded away from zero. Hence, along any solution trajectory, the probability α 2 i of the dominated action converges to zero. 2
The projection dynamic and the target projection dynamic
The projection dynamic was first developed by Nagurney and Zhang (1997) as part of the transportation literature, and was later introduced to game theory by Sandholm (forthcoming), Lahkar and Sandholm (2008) , and Sandholm et al. (2008) .
= 0} be the tangent space of i . Every z i ∈ T i describes a motion between two points in i .
The tangent cone of i at some strategy α i ∈ i is the set of feasible motions from α i towards some other strategy in i , i.e.,
0}. Then, the projection dynamic is defined as followṡ
The following proposition shows that the projection dynamic and the target projection dynamic coincide (i) in the interior of the simplex if the target projection is orthogonal to the motion it causes and (ii) close to completely mixed Nash equilibria. (N, (A i ) i∈N , (U i ) i∈N ) be a normal form game. Proof. (i) By definition the TPD solves, for each player i ∈ N, the following optimization problem: It follows from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions that there are ν ∈ R and μ j 0 such that for all j = 1, . . . , J i
Summing (12) for all j, solving with respect to ν and substituting back yields 
We multiply now (13) by α j i and sum over j:
Now subtract (14) from (15) to find
0 for all j = 1, . . . , J i and α ∈ int( ), it follows that μ j = 0 for all pure strategies j = 1, . . . , J i . Then, it follows from Proposition 2.2(ii) that the projection can be rewritten as
, which implies that for every i ∈ N and every j ∈ J i the TPD becomeṡ
The previous formula is the projection dynamic for all completely mixed strategies , which proves the proposition.
(ii) By Nash stationarity,α i = 0. Since α ∈ int( ), it follows that α 
Special classes of games
In this section we study the properties of the TPD in some special classes of games. Sandholm et al. (2008) prove a number of stability results for potential and stable games under the projection dynamic. Stable games (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2008 ) are a family of normal form games characterized by the following condition:
Stable games
for every α i , β i ∈ i and for all i ∈ N. The game is null (strictly) stable if (16) holds with equality (strict inequality).
Proposition 4.1. Let (N, (A i ) i∈N , (U i ) i∈N ) be a normal form game and let α be a completely mixed Nash equilibrium. 
Zero-sum games
A very interesting and widely explored class of games is the zero-sum games. We say that a normal form game is zerosum if i∈N u i (a) = 0 for every a ∈ A. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2008) establish that zero-sum games are null stable. By Proposition 4.1(iii), every trajectory of the TPD that gets sufficiently close to a completely mixed equilibrium in two-players zero-sum games forms a closed cyclical orbit around it. That is, if β 0 ∈ O and β belongs to the trajectory of the (unique) solution of (3) with initial value β 0 , then β − α = β 0 − α . Typical examples include the matching pennies and the rock-paper-scissors games.
Games with strict Nash equilibria
Recall that in finite strategic games a Nash equilibrium is strict if each player chooses the unique best reply, i.e., α ∈ is a strict Nash equilibrium if α i , U i (α) > β i , U i (α) for all β ∈ and all i ∈ N. Consequently, strict Nash equilibria are equilibria in pure strategies. This follows from the fact that a mixed strategy α i is a best response to α if and only if all actions assigned positive probability by α i are best responses to α, implying that i is indifferent between these actions, and therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for the strict equilibrium is violated. Proof. Let α be a strict Nash equilibrium. Since α must be in pure strategies, without loss of generality, each i ∈ N plays his first action:
. By definition, for each i ∈ N and j ∈ {2, . . . , J i }:
By continuity, there is a neighborhood O of α such that for all β ∈ O, i ∈ N, and j ∈ {2, . . . , J i }:
For all β ∈ O and i ∈ N, Remark 2.1 implies that
2 is a Lyapunov function: It is non-negative, zero only at α, and if β ∈ O \ {α}:
Given the existence of the Lyapunov function L, the equilibrium α is asymptotically stable (Hirsch and Smale, 1974, Ch. 9) . 2
Games with evolutionarily stable strategies
We focus on symmetric two-player normal form games. A two player game is called symmetric if A 1 = A 2 = A and
We say that (α, α) is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a symmetric two-player normal form game (Maynard Smith, 1982; Weibull, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) if for all β = α:
That is, a strategy is evolutionarily stable if it is robust to behavioral mutations: small mutations receive a strictly lower postentry payoff than the incumbent strategy. ESS is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, so all ESS are rest points of every dynamic that satisfies Nash stationarity. Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Hofbauer et al. (1979) show that every ESS is asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamic. However, a similar result cannot be established for the TPD. Instead we provide some partial stability results. Games with a completely mixed evolutionary stable strategy are strictly stable (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2008) . Proposition 4.1(ii) thus implies: 
for all β ∈ O. Now, we consider two cases: Case 1. Let [β 2 + U 2 (β) + λ(β)] + > 0, which implies again due to Proposition 2.2(ii) that λ(β) = − 
where e 2 = (0, 1) denotes the pure strategy a 2 .
Case 2. Let [β 2 + U 2 (β) + λ(β)] + = 0, which implies again due to Proposition 2.2(ii) that λ(β) = 1 − β 1 − U 1 (β). Substituting into Eq. (17) yieldṡ
Consider now L(β) = 1 − β 1 for β ∈ O, which is a Lyapunov function: it is non-negative, equal to zero only at e 1 , and for all β ∈ O \ {e 1 } L = −β 1 < 0, which follows from (18) and (19) and completes the proof. 2
(ii) Let x ∈ R n . The function T : R → R defined for each λ ∈ R by T (λ) = 2 . This is a convex quadratic optimization problem with linear constraints, so the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize the minimum location: y * ∈ n solves the problem if and only if there exist Lagrange multipliers μ i 0 associated with the inequality constraints y i 0 and ν ∈ R associated with the equality constraint n i=1 y i = 1 such that for each i = 1, . . . ,n:
μ i y * i = 0.
Condition (20) (20) and (21) shows that these necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied. 2
